Sprint Played Softball for Too Long
In observing the events leading up to Gary
Forsee’s removal as Sprint CEO in October, and the company’s ensuing
abandonment of their WiMax-service partnering with Clearwire, one thing becomes
obvious. Well, 3 things. The first is so obvious I don’t even have
to say it: Large mergers rarely work in tech (see HP-Compaq, Alcatel-Lucent,
etc.), and equity is destroyed.
Sprint-Nextel is no exception.
The second is that post-merger decisions can’t
be done by committee. It can’t be done by canvassing employees to see
what strategy they prefer, or where they want to work (Sprint’s operations are
still split between Kansas City and the Washington DC area).
The merger execution has to be a bit
dictatorial. The corporate office has to issue marching orders, and
directors must execute. (similar holds for corporate re-organizations)
Otherwise the mergers are even more
vulnerable to losing market share than they already are.
The third thing is tied to the second: A firm implementation plan for what to do with the network assets, handset product lines, services offering, billing, and customer service has to be completed within the first 3 months. Sure, there must be plenty of fact-finding and weighing of options during this time, but then the orders have to come. The following 12-18 months need to be about executing the plan.
Despite the problems with Sprint’s
difficult merger, I look forward to seeing them leverage their assets and
ultimately offering an irresistible proposition to the marketplace.





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